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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a theory of phenomenal consciousness which 
accords with both the science-friendly spirit of physicalism and the 
acknowledgement of panpsychism that phenomenal properties may be 
inextricably linked to entities, but with none of the problems associated with 
either type of model. Initially, physicalism and panpsychism are evaluated by the 
lights of their most serious problems, and solutions are offered to these problems 
from the point of view of a third kind of model: intrinsic naturalism, presented in 
the final chapter. This model holds consciousness to be among the battery of a 
functional system’s intrinsic (i.e. non-dispositional) properties. A definition is 
given, and defence made for the existence of these properties, and their 
compatibility with an otherwise physicalist ontology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In this thesis, I shall attempt to develop a solution to the problem of 
consciousness: why is it that we have conscious experiences, and how do they fit 
into the physical world? Dualistic or panpsychist theories seem insufficient, as do 
traditional physicalist ones. I believe that a type-F monist theory of some sort 
will provide the solution. My focus will not be on the mind-body problem itself, 
but specifically on what sort of type-F monist solution to it would be most fitting.  
 
Since we inhabit a world where all phenomena thus far observed are reducible to 
purely physical terms, it is desirable to have a theory of consciousness which is 
compatible with this, if not itself physicalist. To that end, it is my intention to 
develop a panprotopsychist model of consciousness comprising aspects of a 
number of other models; in particular neutral monism. I shall show that 
panprotopsychism is less vulnerable to certain flaws than physicalist and 
panpsychist models of consciousness. 
 
The structure of this dissertation will be as follows. In the first chapter, I shall 
introduce the problem more thoroughly, and argue that physicalism seems 
initially unsatisfying. I shall describe the dominant positions. I shall show that 
while a number of phenomena previously believed to be non-physical have since 
been shown to be reducible to physical principles, consciousness remains the 
exception. 
 
In the second chapter, I shall examine panpsychist theories, and the problems 
entailed by them. I shall discuss the problems shared between panpsychism and 
panprotopsychism, and argue that most of these problems can be solved far 
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more easily from a panprotopsychist point of view than a panpsychist one. I shall 
argue in particular that consciousness can only reasonably be considered a 
property of functional systems. 
 
In the third chapter, I shall discuss the problems with traditional models of 
physicalism, and show how a type-F monist position can avoid these problems. I 
shall discuss the difference between physical and what I call ‘intrinsic’ properties, 
and argue that a theory which appeals to intrinsic properties in order to explain 
consciousness is not a physicalist one in the standard sense, though it may be 
considered to demonstrate a physicalistic attitude. 
 
In the final chapter, I shall examine a theory of my own, called ‘intrinsic 
naturalism’, which I believe both offers useful ways of thinking about the 
problem, and remains compatible with an otherwise physicalist ontology. Here, I 
shall specify the kind of functional system which I believe can possess 
consciousness as a property (and argue for the qualifications which make 
something such a system), and finally I shall attempt to anticipate potential 
worries which the theory may engender. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CONSCIOUSNESS IN A PHYSICAL WORLD 
 
The problem of consciousness 
The term ‘consciousness’ has many definitions, including wakefulness, 
awareness, access to one’s own cognitive states, and the possession of cognitive 
and emotional faculties. Throughout this dissertation, however, I shall use the 
term to refer to phenomenal consciousness: the intrinsic quality of experience. 
Experience consists of qualia; these are elements of experience such as the 
sensation of seeing red, the taste of salt, the smell of roses, the feeling of 
embarrassment and so forth. The term can even encapsulate broader concepts 
such as ‘what it is like to see a friend’; there are potentially infinite kinds of 
qualia. In fact, because it is impossible to communicate the nature of qualia to 
others, classifying or quantifying them is a fruitless activity. 
 
Because phenomenal consciousness is not described in terms of its causal role 
(there are very few coherent views about what this role might be, although many 
people have an intuition that it must have one), it seems to invite further 
explanation on top of the explanations given for various cognitive functions. If 
someone were to say, “You have explained how neurons arrange themselves to 
adapt to new information, but you have not explained learning”, the response 
would be a simple semantic one, that learning is a concept encapsulated entirely 
by the explanation of that functional process. However, even when such 
functional processes have been described, the question of what it is like 
subjectively to experience such a process remains pertinent. This implies that 
consciousness may not come about by the same physical and functional 
processes as cognition, emotion and so forth, and that its nature may be 
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separate from the otherwise physicalist ontology which modern science has 
largely adopted. In simpler terms, the mystery at hand is how the obviously 
phenomenal can be emergent from what we can reasonably presume to be non-
phenomenal matter1. 
 
It does seem as though phenomenal facts are supervenient upon physical facts 
(which is to say that two people could not be identical physically without sharing 
the same experience), however the precise nature of this relationship must be 
qualified. Chalmers (1996) distinguishes between global and local supervenience. 
There does not seem to be any reason to suggest that two physically identical 
individuals within this world would be phenomenally distinct; that would entail a 
counterintuitive lack of correlation between neural states and their accompanying 
qualia. It therefore seems the case that phenomenal facts supervene upon 
physical facts locally (if at all), rather than globally. That is to say that as long as 
the two physically identical individuals are within the same world, they should be 
phenomenally identical. Chalmers also distinguishes between logical and natural 
supervenience, and it is the application of this distinction to the problem of 
consciousness which generates the greatest controversy between physicalists 
and non-physicalists. Physicalists, of course, argue that phenomenal facts are 
logically (that is, necessarily in all worlds) supervenient upon physical facts; one 
cannot have two worlds identical with regards to their physical facts but that 
differ in regard to their phenomenal (or indeed any) facts. Chalmers, and many 
non-physicalists, argue that in fact this supervenience is only natural (in other 
words it is contingent, and only happens to be the case in some worlds such as 
our own). It happens to be that in this world, phenomenal facts are (likely to be) 
fixed by physical facts, due to whatever relationship exists between them. It is, 
                                       
1 This is not always presumed to be the case. See the section on Panpsychism later in this chapter. 
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however, conceivable that there is a world physically identical to ours which lacks 
phenomenal properties. It is, naturally, arguable that such a conception may be 
caused by a misunderstanding of what physical identity entails, however this 
seems unlikely. We have a good understanding of what it means to say that 
‘water is physically identical to H2O’ and as such the notion of having two worlds 
which are H2O-identical but not water-identical is not conceivable (as long as one 
knows everything physical about water). 
 
The problem of consciousness is a problem precisely because qualia do not have 
characteristics similar to any other physical phenomenon (most conspicuously, 
they are only available first-person; an external observer simply does not have 
access to the phenomenal properties of another individual), nor do they seem to 
fit easily into a physical world (being difficult to fit into a causal picture of the 
world). I shall argue that although phenomenal facts cannot be reduced to 
physical facts, as can the cognitive processes which they accompany, they are 
not completely independent from the physical world. 
 
I am not going to argue against physicalism per se, but I believe that it has 
problems at its core which can be solved through non-physicalist models. First, it 
will be instructive to examine some historical examples of phenomena which 
were thought to be non- or extra-physical. Later, I shall compare the non-
physical consciousness arguments with these historical positions. 
 
Historical challenges to the supremacy of the physical 
A number of phenomena have been suspected, as consciousness is now, to be 
the result of non-physical processes or properties. Indeed, several physicalists 
often point to these now debunked theories, meaning to infer that non-
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physicalism about consciousness will soon be such a theory. I believe, however, 
that there is a very good reason that consciousness has remained the last 
natural phenomenon to have its physicality called into serious question. Before I 
address my reasons for believing this, however, it will be instructive to explain 
why some of these other theories have since been made redundant by 
physicalism. 
 
From ancient times, the philosophy of vitalism was a popular way of thinking 
about biological life. The two tenets of vitalism are: that the functions of an 
organism cannot be reduced to biology alone, and must evoke some sort of 
inherently ‘living’ property; and that the processes within all living things cannot 
be explained in terms of physics and chemistry alone, because life is a 
fundamental property of the organism. Of course, this view is no longer held 
because the mechanisms of life have been elucidated increasingly since the 
invention of the microscope. It is now a matter of scientific orthodoxy that the 
cellular metabolic mechanisms that constitute life are entirely explicable through 
chemical, and ultimately physical, principles. In short, there is no need to resort 
to the invocation of a fundamental non-physical property of ‘life’, the so-called 
élan vital. 
 
A similar theory emerged from the era when alchemy was evolving into 
chemistry, and is known as ‘phlogiston theory’. Before scientists had learned how 
to detect the presence of gases, it was not known how processes such as rusting 
and combustion occurred. A massless, colourless, and otherwise undetectable 
substance called phlogiston was claimed to exist in the late seventeenth century, 
and was said to be the substance contained within all materials, released upon 
combustion. Now, chemists understand the chemical processes involved in 
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oxidation, and the energy transfer between molecules. A combination of these 
factors entirely accounts for combustion without the need for a pseudo-physical 
factor the only ‘evidence’ for whose existence was combustion itself.  
 
More recently, scientists are coming to show that the very origin of the Universe 
and the life therein can be explained purely in terms of physical, self-organising 
matter without invoking an intelligent creator being. Human intelligence, 
personality and emotion are all increasingly explicable through biological and 
ultimately physical terms without recourse to concepts such as a soul. Of course, 
Descartes’ famous substance dualism becomes progressively less relevant as our 
understanding of neuropsychology increases, and the need for a separate non-
physical source of thought and emotion decreases. These are but a few examples 
of how science has produced a physicalist worldview. I shall argue that 
consciousness is, perhaps uniquely, an exception to the rule that all observable 
phenomena can be explained with physical principles. Furthermore, unlike the 
above-mentioned phenomena, consciousness may indeed require some sort of 
non-physical property to be added to the inventory of the Universe’s properties. 
 
Why consciousness is almost certainly non-physical 
One of the reasons that vitalism is no longer a position held by scientists is that 
it no longer serves to explain anything. In other words, it was only ever 
subscribed to because the ‘vital spirit’ was thought to be the only phenomenon 
which could explain the functions of life. Now that scientists have near-complete 
models of metabolism and reproduction, nothing remains to be explained. 
Occam’s razor stipulates that one should avoid the introduction of entities into an 
explanation unless they are strictly necessary, and the élan vital is not necessary 
to explain the functions of life once one understands cellular mechanisms. 
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Phenomenal consciousness serves no function. The only causal role it might have 
is in giving us the knowledge that we possess it, and this is potentially 
problematic. There are ways to show that we can know we are conscious without 
admitting consciousness to be causal, however. Chalmers (2004) and Brogaard 
(2010) both argue that phenomenal experience has intentional content, such 
that in having the experiences we thereby come to know we are having them. 
Chalmers argues, further, that neither phenomenal nor intentional properties can 
be asserted to be more fundamental than the other. If phenomenal experiences 
inherently contain the concepts by which I, as the experiencer, come to 
recognise them (as I do when I say that I know I am seeing red), they do not 
need to be causal in such a way as to threaten a position which requires 
consciousness not to be causal. 
 
Proponents of the conceivability argument would suggest that even my zombie 
twin (that is to say, someone who is physically identical to me but who lacks 
phenomenal consciousness) would consider himself conscious and as such would 
debate the matter with other zombies. Other than that tenuous claim to causal 
function, there is no other strongly coherent sense in which qualia have a causal 
effect on us. Even pain, which seems a particularly vivid example of an 
evolutionary purpose for phenomenal consciousness, has a neuropsychological 
aspect to it which entirely explains our behaviour when in pain, and has presents 
no need to invoke qualia. I shall return to this example in my third chapter about 
physicalism. For now, let me simply state that one can build a complete causal 
model of a human being’s entire repertoire of behaviour without needing 
consciousness. As Chalmers (1996, 5) puts it, “…consciousness is surprising.” 
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It is difficult to prove the point, but when I respond in some way to a pain 
sensation, there is no obvious reason why the entire sequence of events from 
receipt of stimulus to production of response is not entirely within the realm of 
the biomechanics of my nervous system. There does not seem to be any need for 
pain to be phenomenally painful; indeed, as Chalmers (1996) argues, my zombie 
twin would still think himself to be feeling pain, and if we were to extract from a 
living organism enough of a nervous system to detect pain, we would not 
suppose that this array of nervous tissue had any qualia. Let us also recall the 
evidence I discussed in the panpsychism chapter, concerning my brain’s control 
over my body; these outputs are not accompanied by phenomenal feels, yet 
there is a distinctly obvious causal mechanism in place. 
 
I shall employ a parallel to Chalmers’ vanishing qualia argument to make my 
point more plainly, and perhaps in a way which will be more persuasive to 
physicalists. Let us imagine a simple system wherein a man, S, lifts a weight by 
means of a pulley. Once S has pulled on the cord, the explanation for the 
elevation of the weight is purely mechanical; unless we adopt panpsychism, we 
have no motivation to add consciousness to this picture (note my emphasis on 
the moment after S has pulled the cord; S himself may have consciousness, but 
it is not relevant here). Suppose we increase the system’s complexity so that 
there are a few more weighs and pulleys. Again, once S has applied force to the 
cord, there does not seem to be any necessity to add consciousness to the 
mechanism. Now we shall increase the complexity yet more; S now stands on a 
platform which is on wheels and attached to the mechanism. When he pulls the 
cord, the system of ropes and weights is arranged such that S is withdrawn 
sharply from his initial position, and now cannot reach the activation cord. Here 
we have a rather simple model for a reflexive action; S, playing the part of a 
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painful stimulus, is activating this primitive block-and-tackle nervous system, 
and being repulsed by the system. Does the system need to be conscious? Let us 
finally increase the complexity of the system so that it is a full functional 
analogue of a basic reflex arc. At what point has the system, or any part of it, 
required consciousness in order to withdraw the stimulus from its initial position? 
I do not think there is any need for such a property to be added to the system, 
because mechanical principles are just as adequate to explain the chain of events 
now as they were when we had nothing more than a single weight and pulley. I 
am not contradicting my previous assertion that such a functional system could 
be conscious; indeed it still could. Yet that consciousness would have no 
explanatory power. We could even imagine the construction of a reflex arc from 
the actual biological components, from its most crude instantiation to the swift 
and well-evolved system most animals have. At no point would anything other 
than biochemical processes (themselves a kind of mechanical process) be 
required to explain reflexes. Why, then, should we think qualia to be causally 
efficacious? There seems to be no strong support for such a notion, and as I 
argued in the first chapter, we would not think it necessary to consider 
consciousness at all were it not for each of us having first-person experiences of 
it. 
 
If one accepts the above argument, one must either deny consciousness outright 
(with all of the problems of a priori physicalism) or accept that consciousness 
itself is non-causal. If the physical is causally closed, and a phenomenon exists 
which is causally inefficacious, then it seems that there are properties of physical 
systems which are themselves non-physical. My final theory will acknowledge 
that consciousness is not causal, and in fact requires that this be so. 
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If phenomenal consciousness is non-causal, why should we not discount any 
notion of there being phenomenal consciousness, just as we have the élan vital? 
It is, after all, not a phenomenon which is observable to science, nor one which 
is required in order to explain anything, and seems to be precisely the kind of 
superfluous entity which Occam’s razor would bid us to exclude. However, there 
is one piece of evidence which causes us to keep our belief in consciousness: our 
own consciousness. Each one of us has (certainly I have, and I presume at least 
all humans have) first-hand and hardly disputable evidence of the existence of 
qualia in our own case, which it is impossible for us to show to anyone else. I 
could be a zombie, writing about properties which I do not possess. I know I am 
not, but there is no way for me to convince someone of this; we take it as a 
matter of intuition that since others have a psychology similar to ours, it is 
reasonable to presume that they have phenomenology similar to ours. 
 
A number of questions present themselves at this point: questions about the 
existence, origin and extent of consciousness. What concerns us here is the 
origin of consciousness; it seems reasonable to suggest that our phenomenology 
is tied to our physical properties, but the particular relationship seems to have 
conceptual problems. For instance, it seems very strange that something 
physical should be unobservable in principle from the outside. There is nothing 
subjective in standard physics; everything has an externally observable causal 
impact on everything else. Also, human brains are obviously the sort of physical 
system which can produce consciousness, but since we have no way to know for 
sure that even other brains are conscious, how can we begin to find out if other 
systems or objects are conscious? I believe that there are a few educated 
guesses which can be made in this area, but guesses may be all that we can 
make. 
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Ultimately, any theory of consciousness will have to make assumptions which 
cannot in principle be corroborated. If I devise an emergentist theory of 
consciousness2, I am assuming that fundamental entities are not conscious; if I 
argue for a panpsychist approach, I assume that fundamental entities possess a 
property which I cannot possibly confirm them to have. I believe, however, that 
one is justified in believing something not to have a certain property when it 
exhibits none of the detectable properties which are usually correlated with it. In 
this case, demonstrating cognitive properties is a sign that there may be a 
phenomenal aspect to an entity. Furthermore, since panpsychist theories add 
fundamental consciousness to the ontology of the world, it seems that the 
burden of proof lies with the panpsychist. 
 
Seeking to reconcile the existence of a seemingly non-physical phenomenon with 
an otherwise physicalist ontology, I shall look for a solution that is physicalist in 
spirit if not in letter. In short, I believe that it is desirable that any physicalist 
who believes consciousness to exist (as most do) should have no principled 
problem with my theory. 
 
Although physicalist and panpsychist theories will be examined in their own 
respective chapters, it will be informative to give a brief introduction to them 
now, and how they may be related to a third class of theory, of which mine will 
be a kind: type-F monism. 
 
 
 
                                       
2 For a brief explanation of emergentism, see the section on panpsychism later in this chapter. 
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Physicalism 
I shall now outline the dominant positions concerning the problem of 
consciousness. In their own chapters, I shall examine and evaluate them in 
detail, showing how the problems associated with them may be applied to other 
theories of consciousness. Of a great number of positions, the four which concern 
me are: physicalism; panpsychism; panprotopsychism; and to a lesser extent, 
dualism. Each of these positions is in fact a category enshrining a number of 
models, and to an extent there are theories which merge with two or three 
categories. My ultimate aim is to synthesise such a model; one which is in 
keeping with our otherwise justified physicalist perspective, but which 
acknowledges the non-physicality of consciousness for which I shall continue to 
argue. 
 
Physicalism is predominantly divisible into two strains; a priori physicalism and a 
posteriori physicalism (called type A and B materialism respectively by Chalmers 
(2002)). A priori physicalists deny that there is an epistemic gap between 
physical and phenomenal facts, or believe that if there is a gap then it can be 
closed easily. In simple terms, the type-A solution to the problem of 
consciousness is the claim that there is no problem, because there is a self-
evident entailment from the physical to the phenomenal. It has several forms, 
such as eliminativism and behaviourism, which generally either claim that there 
is no such phenomenon as consciousness, or equate it with behavioural or 
functional states. The relevant difference between the two physicalist paradigms 
examined here is that a priori physicalists deny even the explanatory gap; once 
the physical explanations of awareness, access, the ability to report cognitive 
states and so on are sufficiently detailed, an explanation of what we call 
consciousness will be present therein. 
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Immediately, a parallel seems apparent between those who claim consciousness 
to be something beyond the physical processes of the brain, and a vitalist. 
Indeed, physicalists often use this analogy. However, as Chalmers (ibid.) notes, 
the analogy does not hold; vitalists claimed that the functions which constitute 
life would not be explained without recourse to an intrinsically vital property. 
However, once they had been explained, there was nothing further which 
required an explanation. For an a priori physicalist to argue that the analogy 
holds, he may have to claim that there is no explanandum, which would be 
extremely counter-intuitive; arguably our consciousness is the only phenomenon 
of whose existence we can be certain. To do so would be exemplary of an 
eliminativist position, which is not representative of all type-A theories. 
 
A posteriori physicalists admit that there is an epistemic gap between physical 
and phenomenal facts. However, they then deny that there is an ontological gap. 
This version of physicalism is (unless stated otherwise) the version which I shall 
be discussing in future when I use the term ‘physicalism’, because models within 
this family are held to be solutions to a hard problem, rather than a denial that 
the problem exists. A dominant class of theory within this category is the class of 
‘identity’ theories, where consciousness is held to be identical to the functional 
states of the brain. Importantly, the identity is discovered empirically, in the 
same way that water was discovered to be H2O empirically. The two are 
acknowledged to be conceptually different, but knowing all of the physical facts 
about water entails knowing its identity with H2O. I shall revisit this argument in 
my third chapter, with reference to Jackson’s knowledge argument. 
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Another a posteriori tactic, rather than making analogies such as the one above, 
is to assert there to be a brute, necessary link between the physical and the 
phenomenal. There are various ways to do this, and several arguments fall under 
the category of the ‘phenomenal concept’ strategy. What these arguments have 
in common is that they posit an hypothesis such that we possess certain 
psychological features, and that these features explain why we perceive an 
explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal. These features are 
argued to be physical themselves, thus giving us an entirely physical explanation 
of why there is an explanatory gap. There are several versions of this strategy, 
and several ways to respond to each. Chalmers (2007) argues that in general, 
such positions lead to one of two outcomes: either we are compelled to adopt an 
acquaintance model of how we come to have an explanatory gap (the problems 
with which I shall examine in my third chapter); or they leave us with 
insufficiently strong epistemic relations to explain why we perceive an 
explanatory gap in the first place. I shall examine the epistemic and ontological 
gaps in my third chapter, wherein I endorse the conceivability-possibility link. 
 
Dualism 
Although not one of the primary topics of this thesis, I shall spend some time 
discussing whether my final theory is dualistic. For my purposes, I shall call a 
model ‘dualistic’ if it involves a (one- or two-way) causal link between a physical 
and non-physical domain, where these domains are distinct. I would class 
sepiphenomenalism as dualistic in this regard, as well as the obvious example of 
Cartesian substance dualism. Such models are of no use in solving the problem 
of consciousness because they include an unnecessary causal role for 
consciousness, and still come no closer to solving the problem of why there 
should be anything it is like to be in a particular cognitive state. 
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Even a dualistic theory such as Jackson’s epiphenomenalism, which is only 
dualistic with regards to qualia (as opposed to those which are dualistic with 
regards to cognitive states), has problems. The causal closure of the physical is a 
notion that there is no good reason to violate, and epiphenomenalist theories 
have physical systems imparting causality to a phenomenal realm which cannot 
in turn cause anything in the physical domain. If one accepts, and again I must 
make it clear that I do, the debatable position (given in, e.g. Fair, 1979) that 
causation is identical to the transfer of energy or momentum, the laws of 
thermodynamics are also under threat from such a theory. 
 
Panpsychism 
The dichotomy between a priori physicalism and complete Cartesian dualism 
presents only one dimension of the problem of consciousness. Another axis forms 
its poles at emergentism and panpsychism. 
 
Standard physicalism, epiphenomenalism, panprotopsychism and so forth are all 
emergentist; the most simple entities in the universe (such as the fundamental 
particles) are taken to be non-conscious, whereas human brains are taken to be 
conscious. At some point between these two entities, consciousness emerges, 
and the puzzle which must be solved is how this emergence occurs. The theories 
to be discussed shortly claim that even the fundamental entities in the Universe 
(whatever these may eventually be confirmed to be) possess mental states to 
some degree. These theories fall within the category of ‘panpsychist’, however 
there is a great deal of difference in the definitions of ‘mental’, ‘universe’ and 
‘fundamental’ between many of these models. 
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Broadly speaking, panpsychist theories vary between claiming ubiquitous 
mentality with only rare consciousness, to the precise reverse. What concerns us 
here is not the cognitive aspect of the mental, wherein fundamental entities are 
claimed to posses a mind, or behave in some way which might be called 
‘rational’. I shall refrain, therefore, from considering panpsychist theories which 
propose any mental property beyond phenomenal states. Theories which hold 
phenomenal properties to belong even to non-functional entities are more 
properly described as ‘panexperientialist’, however I shall continue to use the 
term ‘panpsychism’ as it accurately describes the category in which all such 
theories are contained. 
 
Panprotopsychism 
Panpsychism and panprotopsychism are both classified by Chalmers as type-F 
models of consciousness. This is because the feature which they have in common 
is the notion that entities may have intrinsic properties which are inaccessible 
through scientific (i.e. third-person) means. However, the inherent difference 
between them is that panprotopsychism is an emergentist position, and in some 
ways is more compatible with physicalism than panpsychism. 
 
Of course there is a trivial, physicalistic sense in which panprotopsychism is true; 
if one accepts that fundamental entities are non-conscious but that humans are, 
then one must accept that fundamental entities are proto-conscious in the same 
way that a person is a proto-nation. In other words, that they may one day be in 
a position where they form part of a conscious system, but do not necessarily 
have any properties other than their physical ones which can account for this. 
Obviously, a physicalist would argue just that. 
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Chalmers classifies panprotopsychism as a monist position, because his own 
version of it holds there to be one kind of substance in the world, which is a 
‘natural’ substance consisting of both physical and protophenomenal fundamental 
properties. Another way in which panprotopsychism may be considered monist is 
if the physical is all that exists, but that there are (proto)phenomenal aspects to 
physical entities by way of their possessing an intrinsic character. This is an idea 
has been explored by Stoljar (2001) and Russell (1927), most notably, and is 
one to which I shall return when I come to the synthesis of my own model of 
how consciousness relates to the systems which possess it. 
 
Russell famously wrote that physical entities are described by their causal 
relationship with other entities. In other words, a description of an entity’s entire 
causal impact on the world constitutes its complete physical description. 
However, such dispositional relationships (such as charge and mass) are likely to 
be grounded by the intrinsic nature of these entities; a nature which is in 
principle inaccessible through physics. For instance, two particles may share a 
precise causal pattern in the world, identifiable as electrons. However, they may 
not be identical intrinsically, a state of affairs which we would have no way to 
verify. Already this has echoes of the problem of consciousness, and indeed has 
been suggested as a solution to it; if the intrinsic characters of entities are either 
phenomenal themselves or can constitute phenomenal properties (i.e. are 
protophenomenal) then there is an inherent relationship between the physical 
and the phenomenal which is entirely compatible with an otherwise physical 
ontology. For instance, microphysical causal closure is preserved, as it is not with 
theories such as epiphenomenalism, and the laws of physics remain unaltered. 
Whether such a model is called physicalist or dualist is a matter of semantic 
debate, but it does seem to be at the very least a property dualist theory. 
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Panprotopsychism has been argued to have problems associated both with 
panpsychism and physicalism, and in the chapters to follow I shall examine 
whether or not it can be rescued from these criticisms, ultimately arguing that it 
can. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to argue that, at least initially, a physicalist 
approach to an explanation of the existence and nature of phenomenal 
consciousness is unsatisfying. In the following chapter, I shall examine 
panpsychism, and attempt to argue that while it has several advantages over 
physicalism, an emergentist theory is far more desirable from a scientific point of 
view. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PANPSYCHIST MODELS 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that physicalist models of consciousness have 
certain problems, and that it seems desirable to solve these while remaining as 
true to a physicalist picture as possible. In the next chapter, I shall evaluate 
physicalism and its problems more thoroughly. However, because panpsychism 
more obviously suits the criteria for a solution which I stipulated previously, I 
shall examine that first. Although there are several kinds of panpsychist theory, 
it is important to emphasise here that I am only discussing panpsychism in terms 
of phenomenal consciousness; for psychological states, I am content with a 
purely physical model. 
 
I shall begin by examining some of the advantages that panpsychism has over 
physicalism, and then its disadvantages, specifically those which are applicable 
to panprotopsychism. Finally, I shall discuss ways in which these problems can 
be easier to solve with a panprotopsychist model than with panpsychism. My 
conclusion will seem to motivate physicalism, however in the next chapter I shall 
attempt to apply a similar analysis to physicalism. 
 
The appeal of panpsychism 
The most obvious benefit of adopting a panpsychist approach to consciousness is 
that one immediately eliminates the problem of emergence. In particular, true 
ontological emergence, where higher-order features are truly novel, as opposed 
to merely being epistemologically surprising. As physicalists assume non-
functional matter to be non-conscious, they must account for the obvious 
consciousness of human beings, which is not an easy task if one wishes to do so 
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with a physicalist model. However, a panpsychist does not have to explain how 
simple matter becomes conscious in a particular functional arrangement, since 
he will assume that all matter is conscious, because all fundamental entities are 
conscious. This is not the end of the story for the panpsychist; at this point the 
‘combination problem’ is apparent, which I shall discuss this later in the chapter. 
 
Some advantages include that a panpsychist does not have to attribute a causal 
role to consciousness (though it could), and is capable of admitting that 
consciousness is surprising, and that a world with no phenomenal consciousness 
is conceivable. As I shall briefly explore in the next chapter, physicalism’s denial 
of the conceivability of a zombie world is one of its most significant problems, 
because it seems counterintuitive at best and question-begging at worst. 
 
Nagel (1979) puts forward four premises which seem to indicate that a 
panpsychist model of consciousness is viable. Of course, Nagel was writing about 
mental properties in general, including those which I would accept to be 
reducible to physical properties (memory, report, access etc.), however I believe 
that several of his arguments are applicable to the case of phenomenal 
consciousness. I shall now examine some of his arguments. 
 
One of the principles of computing is that of ‘multiple realisability’; that two sets 
of apparatus may perform the same calculations as long as they are functionally 
equivalent, regardless of their material composition. In fact, this principle is 
taken by some (including Chalmers, 1996) to include the functions of the mind; 
an arrangement of silicon chips which is functionally identical to a human brain 
should be capable of precisely a brain’s function. Nagel makes a similar point, in 
that a living organism can be composed of any matter at all, be it carbon 
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molecules from a distant star, or iron from the Earth’s crust. He concludes that 
because any matter can constitute a living, conscious organism, the matter itself 
must possess mental properties such that they can produce our mental 
properties in proper combination. He calls this “a kind of mental chemistry.” 
(ibid., 182) 
 
Nagel’s second and third premises are that consciousness is not a physical 
property, nor implied by the physical properties, of a system. However, it is a 
property of the possessing organism, rather than a substance in its own right (as 
a Cartesian would have it) or a property of some entity such as a soul. 
 
Finally, Nagel argues that no system demonstrates truly (ontologically) emergent 
properties; all properties of such a system are merely the aggregated properties 
of its constituents. It may be that we cannot know how the constituents will 
combine without first combining them, giving the final system epistemologically 
emergent properties, but there are still no new properties to the whole system 
which are not combinations of its constituent properties. 
 
Nagel goes on to say that if we take mental properties to be non-physical (and 
here, he is talking about psychological as opposed to phenomenal properties, but 
if we take him to be talking about phenomenal properties his arguments thus far 
hold), we cannot do other than admit the basic constituents of a living organism 
to have non-physical properties also. Therefore, we must conclude that 
panpsychism is true. I believe that Nagel may be partially correct; I am inclined 
to believe it to be true that if a system has non-physical properties, its 
constituents must also. However, the system’s non-physical properties being 
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phenomenal does not seem to necessitate the constituents having phenomenal 
properties. 
 
Nagel argues that because there are no ontologically emergent properties of a 
system, any system with property Q must have some component or components 
that also have property Q. Yet I am not convinced that the lack of truly 
ontologically emergent properties gives us sufficient motivation to be 
panpsychists. Water is liquid at standard temperature and pressure, so let this be 
property W. Neither oxygen nor hydrogen, water’s only constituents, exhibit 
property W, but this is trivial; knowing everything we do about hydrogen and 
oxygen, we could predict how water will behave. Property W is not ontologically 
emergent, and may not even be sufficiently surprising to be epistemologically 
emergent. Nonetheless, the W property does not appear until the ‘system’ is in 
place, and does not descend to any of its constituents. Therefore, it does not 
seem to injure my case to admit that phenomenal consciousness might not be 
ontologically emergent; even if it is not, I do not have to admit that it is a 
property which extends to my constituent components. 
 
 In short, the intrinsic properties which many panpsychists espouse do not 
themselves need to be phenomenal in order for the properties of overall systems 
to be so; it is here that panpsychism and panprotopsychism fundamentally differ. 
I shall expand upon this in the final chapter, when I discuss how intrinsic non-
phenomenal properties relate to a system’s consciousness. 
 
Problems with panpsychism 
A panprotopsychist theory can share many of the problems of panpsychism, and 
seems to lack the latter’s most significant advantage: avoiding the problem of 
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emergence. A panprotopsychist model still has to account for how consciousness 
emerges. I shall now explore several problems shared commonly by 
panpsychism and panprotopsychism. I shall try to show how in most cases a 
panprotopsychist theory is less susceptible to the problems, and finally I shall 
argue that panprotopsychism has one clear advantage over panpsychism: it can 
account for the one example of a system we can be sure is usually conscious, but 
that loses consciousness while remaining functional. 
 
One of the most apparent problems with panpsychism is that it lacks even the 
weak empirical link between physical and mental properties that a broadly 
functionalist approach espouses. Most emergentists would argue that there is 
likely to be a correlation between functional and phenomenal states, and that 
one can infer conscious properties to exist in functional systems at least as 
complex as human brains (although different theorists are more or less generous 
as to this point, and one cannot strongly assert an entailment between functional 
systems and consciousness, based solely on our own functionality and 
consciousless). However, there is none but the flimsiest evidence that simple 
entities have anything which might be called behaviour. In other words, the 
neural correlates which exist in humans and most animals have not been 
observed in inanimate objects. 
 
A major difficulty for panpsychism is the combination problem. Although 
panpsychism is not emergentist in that it does not claim phenomenal 
consciousness per se to be emergent from physical arrangements, it still must be 
the case that conscious experience grows more complex as functional complexity 
increases. A human mind would experience much more vivid qualia than a 
thermostat, and so much more than a fundamental entity that the consciousness 
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of an electron must be incomprehensibly basic. The combination problem thus 
arises, and has two aspects: why, if all matter is conscious, is there not a more 
general diffusion of consciousness; and how is it that the consciousnesses of 
more basic entities become subsumed into the consciousness of the whole? 
 
The latter is more of a mystery than a fundamental problem, however the former 
certainly represents a problem for panpsychism. Descartes famously held the 
mind to be non-physical, there being no coherent sense in which it could be said 
to have a location in space. However, it seems to be perfectly sensible to assert 
that my consciousness is located in my body, as opposed to outside it. I might 
even be more specific and point to my nervous system as its ultimate location. 
However, if panpsychism is true, then why does the consciousness of my brain 
not merge with the consciousness of the molecules within my skull, skin and so 
on? Why, when molecules from my food become part of me, is my experience 
not supplemented? 
 
An answer to this may come from what I have said previously about the 
simplicity of the qualia of simpler entities. In fact, I might well be experiencing 
the collective qualia of every molecule in my body, but my senses and the 
processing which enables them to work are flooding my consciousness with far 
more vivid qualia than I would be experiencing as an inert body (a panpsychist 
must surely concede that a corpse has consciousness, although to what extent 
they very likely differ). In fact, I shall make a similar argument later on when I 
argue that panprotopsychism can avoid the combination problem. I do not 
believe that panpsychism can avoid the problem, because in panpsychism the 
only aspect of consciousness which is altered by increased functional complexity 
is its intensity, rather than its presence. Thus, I believe it is much more difficult 
26 
for a panpsychist to dismiss the combination problem than it is for a 
panprotopsychist. 
 
The other aspect of the problem remains, however; my nervous system is 
comprised of many functional systems, yet I seem to experience a constant, 
integrated stream of experience. This is sometimes referred to (such as by 
Revonsuo, 1999 and Blackmore, 2003) as the ‘binding problem’. The term is also 
used for a problem in the study of visual perception, and it is a very similar 
problem: how do individual elements of perception (or in our case, qualia) come 
together to form what seems to be a ‘Cartesian theatre’ – a unified, smooth 
experience rather like a film? Unless one wishes to argue that there is indeed a 
homunculus within one’s mind for whom an elaborate sensory theatre is being 
orchestrated, there is immediately a problem with regards to how experience 
comes together. After all, in neurological terms, the brain is divided into quite 
differentiated areas of processing. 
 
I believe that this is what Chalmers would call an easy problem, because it does 
not seem to be a problem of phenomenal consciousness, but a problem of 
psychological consciousness. In other words, it seems clear that the reason we 
have a unified, smooth experience is that we have neurological mechanisms 
which bring all of the disparate processes together in some way. I believe that a 
standard psychological explanation will suffice here, given the relationship 
between the phenomenal and the physical which I discussed in the first chapter. 
I shall now review, briefly, a few prominent neurological and cognitive theories of 
the unity of consciousness. Again, what I am aiming to show is that a 
panprotopsychist theory can use such models to solve the combination problem, 
but a panpsychist theory cannot (at least, it cannot as easily), because the latter 
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cannot make an appeal to the functionality of a system without itself becoming 
emergentist. 
 
Certainly, we know from neuropsychology that the information our brains receive 
is filtered so that insignificant data are excluded from our perceptions. It has also 
been demonstrated that our perceptions can be altered as we are experiencing 
them (for instance, several optical illusions are broken by the addition of some 
piece of information). Dennett (1991) proposed something called the ‘multiple 
drafts’ model, wherein some sort of neurological process ‘oversees’ the various 
perceptual inputs and constructs a dominant perception according to various 
criteria (if something makes sense based on past experience, for instance). This 
idea leads to an argument for the evolution of consciousness (and here, I refer to 
psychological rather than phenomenal consciousness). There may be no 
Cartesian Theatre, however the illusion that our minds are whole and unified is a 
strong and very pervasive one. This seems to have an evolutionary advantage, 
since the brain has to control all of our motor functions. A brain that could not 
correctly integrate all of its inputs would result in a body which was not properly 
under control. Thus, the mechanism which gives the illusion of the Cartesian 
Theatre seems to be necessary if psychological order is to be maintained. 
 
Crick and Koch (1990) argued that the synchronicity of neural firing in the visual 
cortices of cats (so-called ‘gamma oscillations’ of 35-75 Hz) had something to do 
with the binding of visual information into a single stream of visual 
consciousness. The idea is that when all of the neurons which are processing the 
information derived from the perception of a single object are firing in 
synchronicity, the object ‘comes together’ in the brain. Crick (1994, 245) called 
this “the neural correlate of visual awareness.” A mechanism within the brain 
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(suggested by Crick and Koch to be the thalamus) selects which features are to 
be bound together, and then binds them by synchronising the firing rates of the 
relevant neurons. 
 
What relevance are such theories to the combination problem? I believe that 
they demonstrate something crucial, namely that consciousness seems to come 
about only with the correct arrangement of functional systems. However, this 
argument may be equally applicable to panpsychism; the reason I am not 
experiencing the consciousness of my individual neurons may simply be that the 
‘editor’ (to use Dennett’s newspaper analogy) which intercedes between the 
higher and lower levels of consciousness does not exist. That is to say, the 
system which unifies my psychological (and therefore phenomenal) 
consciousness by linking all of the different functional areas of the brain, may not 
happen to have an equivalent which is able to ‘feed’ the consciousness of my 
brain’s constituents (i.e. neurons) into the consciousness of the larger systems. 
To distinguish panprotopsychism from panpsychism, there must be a situation in 
which the two disagree as to whether a system is conscious. There must exist a 
functional system which does not produce consciousness, because that would 
demonstrate that an emergentist theory was correct, while casting serious doubt 
over a panpsychist theory. Unfortunately, in most cases, it is impossible to show 
conclusively that a system is not conscious. However, I believe there to be one 
case for which we can make strong, evidenced arguments. 
 
Unconsciousness 
As previously mentioned, it is not enough for me to say that because I am both 
functional and conscious, I can assert that all conscious entities must be 
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functional. This idea has some prima facie appeal, but it is too weak to do the job 
I would have it do: to show that consciousness requires function.  
 
If panpsychism is correct, then basic, non-functional entities are conscious, and 
their consciousness is merely amplified by being in a functional system. If there 
were a functional system which did not exhibit consciousness, it would severely 
weaken the claim that all functional systems were conscious. If not even all 
functional systems are conscious, then grave doubt is cast over the notion that 
any non-functional entity could be. Previously, I discussed Chalmers’ idea that 
one cannot in principle say that even the most basic functional system is non-
conscious, and that this can lead not only to counterintuitive conclusions, but 
ultimately to panpsychism. I believe that I can demonstrate one case of a 
complex functional system which we have no reason to believe to be 
phenomenally conscious: the sleeping human brain. 
 
Of course, a brain in deep (or slow-wave) sleep is still functioning, and is still a 
more complex functional system than Chalmers’ thermostat. However, it exhibits 
none of the standard psychological properties which we might label as conscious. 
There is no sense of time, nor of one’s own body, one has no awareness of self 
or surroundings, and one does not generate memories (which is not to say that 
memories are not in some way processed during this time, merely that no new 
ones seem to be generated). In fact, compared to when one is awake, there is 
very little brain activity during slow-wave sleep; neurons exhibit ‘delta waves’, 
meaning that they only exhibit measurable electrical activity up to four times per 
second (compare to the 30-100 cycles per second demonstrated during gamma 
activity, such as when integrating sensory data from two or more senses (Kisley 
and Cornwell, 2006)). It should be noted that electroencephalographs only 
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measure synchronised activity by large clusters of neurons; individual neurons 
may still be firing far more often. 
 
The part of the brain which is chiefly responsible for the regulation of circadian 
cycles, the suprachiasmatic nucleus, remains active throughout the sleep-waking 
cycle (Mistlberger, 2005), so that it can regulate the stage of sleep which the 
brain occupies. Furthermore, one can still detect sound, albeit at a much higher 
threshold than when awake (Bonnet and Johnson, 1978). This indicates that the 
brain is still functional, and in a state analogous to an electronic device that is ‘on 
stand by’. The brain is at its most basically functional during this state, and it is 
likely that it does not produce consciousness. 
 
It may seem as though to assert strongly that one is not phenomenally conscious 
during deep sleep is to say more than the evidence allows. It is true that, as with 
any matter of phenomenal consciousness, there is no empirical way to be sure. 
However, I believe it is possible to be reasonably confident in the matter. I 
believe that I am not a zombie because not only am I experiencing qualia at this 
very moment, I remember having done so in the past (which is to say, I can re-
create certain sensory conditions at will, and they accord with what I believe has 
happened to me in the past, so I presume that I was conscious at the time of 
these events). Furthermore, I demonstrate certain kinds of measurable brain 
activity when I am experiencing these qualia. In other words, I am conscious by 
the standard psychological definitions of the term. As I have argued before, the 
conditions which we label as ‘psychological consciousness’ are the neural 
correlates of the phenomenal consciousness which I cannot demonstrate to an 
external observer. They are, in short, the only reason I have to assume that 
anyone besides myself is capable of experiencing qualia. It is not conclusive 
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evidence, but it makes enormous intuitive sense; I have no reason to think that I 
alone am conscious among zombies. 
 
However, on a nightly basis, I undergo neurological conditions which do not 
constitute any form of psychological consciousness. In fact, my brain activity is 
very slow indeed (normally, only infants exhibit wakefulness while in delta-wave 
activity (Taylor and Rutter, 2002)). Furthermore, unlike the periods of sleep 
which I do remember (i.e. the periods of rapid eye movement which indicate 
dreaming), I have no memory at all of these periods of deep sleep. Without the 
ability to remember having experienced qualia, and knowing that I was not 
conscious in any psychological sense, I do not believe I can presume to assert 
myself as having been phenomenally conscious. Furthermore, I believe that I 
can, being the only authority on my own consciousness, rule out my 
consciousness during deep sleep. 
 
If I am indeed not phenomenally conscious while my brain is still a functional 
processor, then I do not think panpsychism can hold. For, if I assert that my 
qualia were merely less complex in a slow-wave state, while lacking even the 
first-person evidence which suffices for my belief in my own consciousness when 
awake, I am making a baseless assertion. I have, quite literally, no more reason 
to believe that I am conscious during slow-wave sleep than I have to believe that 
an electron or a quark is conscious. 
 
This is no problem for a panprotopsychist; a panprotopsychist can say that 
phenomenal consciousness only comes about as a property of functional systems 
of a certain complexity. In fact, this even gives us an idea of where to draw the 
line on Chalmers’ sliding scale; if a psychologically conscious human is 
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phenomenally conscious, and a partially-conscious human (e.g. one in REM-
sleep) has less vivid qualia, and an unconscious human experiences no qualia, 
we have measurable standards for comparison with other functional systems. 
There would be, in short, no need to assert the consciousness of anything 
simpler than a human brain in the delta state, because we would already have 
ruled out the consciousness of such a brain. 
 
This is not a refutation of panpsychism; a panpsychist may argue that because 
the unifying system responsible for the over-arching consciousness we 
experience is not active during unconsciousness, that the unified consciousness 
is not present, although the consciousnesses of individual units would still be 
present. However, such a position would seem akin to making excuses. Let us 
consider the three relevant positions with regards to this example. First, the 
physicalist approach does not need to evoke consciousness in lesser brain 
systems, so can accommodate unconsciousness with no difficulty. My position, as 
we shall see in the final chapter, can accommodate unconsciousness because the 
intrinsic character of the slow-wave brain is not such that it features 
consciousness. The panpsychist response is similar to my own, however it seems 
to run afoul of Occam’s razor, by including an entity (phenomenal consciousness) 
beyond its necessity. Once again, panpsychism is the least intuitive and most 
elaborate among a number of models. It is far easier to accept physicalism, or a 
panprotopsychist approach such as my own, than to continue to add counter-
intuitive excuses for every problem which panpsychism faces. 
 
Another piece of evidence which seems to support the idea that a functionally 
complex system need not be phenomenally conscious is that there is 
undoubtedly a great deal of unconscious processing within the brain. That is, a 
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lot of processing which occurs without there being anything it is like for these 
processes to occur. A rather obvious example is that of brain output; I cannot 
attend to any sensation of commanding my limbs to move. There is nothing it is 
like for my brain to control my body, yet it quite obviously happens. In the final 
chapter, I shall attempt to account for the difference between phenomenally 
conscious brain processes and those which are not accompanied by qualia. 
 
Conclusion 
I believe that my final theory will have something in common with panpsychism; 
that is, a recognition that consciousness is non-physical, and a need to show how 
consciousness is extant in light of these non-physical properties. However, I do 
not believe that the notions of fundamentality and ubiquity central to 
panpsychism hold, nor that they need to in order to avoid the problems of 
physicalism. 
 
I have argued that while both panpsychism and panprotopsychism can avoid the 
combination problem, a panprotopsychist theory can do so far more 
straightforwardly with appeals to cognitive psychological models of informational 
binding. The ability of a panprotopsychist theory to deny phenomenal 
consciousness to systems and entities which are not functional in the right way is 
a strength, because it can avoid intuitive problems such as the phenomenal 
thermostat and the absurd notion of conscious electrons. Furthermore, I have 
argued that the most important difference between panpsychism and 
panprotopsychism is that the latter can accommodate non-conscious functional 
systems while the latter cannot accommodate any non-conscious system; for 
this, I have appealed to the one example from science of a system whose 
consciousness depends upon its functional state. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PHYSICALIST MODELS 
 
In the first chapter, I argued that physicalist attempts to bridge the epistemic 
gap between the physical and the phenomenal were unsatisfactory. In the 
previous chapter, I argued that panpsychism is not a viable alternative, and 
made arguments which seemed to lead us towards a physicalist conclusion. Now, 
I intend to alter the mood of the dissertation once again, by presenting 
arguments against physicalism. My purpose here is to show that there is a 
middle ground between panpsychism and physicalism which can appeal to 
proponents of both kinds of model. A panprotopsychist approach may be simpler 
and more appealing to a certain kind of physicalist than the elaborate counter-
arguments which physicalists often employ. Throughout this chapter, I shall refer 
to a posteriori physicalism, since the a priori variety (as discussed in the first 
chapter) constitutes more of a denial that there is a problem, rather than a 
solution to it. 
 
I shall begin with an analysis of physicalism in general, and its advantages over 
the main alternatives: substance dualism and panpsychism. I shall then discuss 
its problems, namely those deriving from the knowledge and conceivability 
arguments. Finally, as in the panpsychism chapter, I shall try to show that 
panprotopsychism, properly interpreted, can avoid these problems far more 
easily than standard physicalism. 
 
Conceptions of the physical 
If, as I mentioned in the first chapter, I am content to preserve a physicalist 
picture as it applies to every other phenomenon in nature, why is it that it does 
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not apply to consciousness? In order to answer this question I shall examine two 
pertinent conceptions of what it means for a property to be considered physical. I 
intend to argue that of the two conceptions of the physical I shall here examine, 
one cannot account for consciousness, and the other, which is far more likely to 
be able to do so, is not in fact a conception of the physical at all, at least in the 
standard sense. 
 
Central to my forthcoming argument is the notion that phenomenal 
consciousness is subjective, which is to say, accessible only in the first person. 
All that is accessible from biology and psychology are the neural, chemical and 
behavioural correlates of consciousness. These are all, of course, physical in the 
sense that they supervene upon physical entities and properties. Therefore, for a 
theory to be able to account for consciousness, it must be able to account for the 
subjective. If we are to avoid substance dualism, we must be able to place the 
subjective into our ontology as either fundamental (as a panpsychist) or part of 
some other aspect of the natural world, physical or otherwise. In the final 
chapter of this dissertation, I shall appeal to the notion of the intrinsic character 
of physical entities. As I am about to attempt to show, this notion can form a 
part of physicalism insofar as physicalism can admit the existence of intrinsic 
properties. Ultimately, however, such an admission significantly blunts the claim 
that all properties are physical. 
 
Stoljar (2001) argued that there are two possible conceptions of the physical. 
The aim of his paper was to show the inherent error of the conceivability 
argument against physicalism: that the first premise talks of one conception of 
the physical, and the second premise talks of the other, and therefore that the 
conclusion (that physicalism is false) cannot be reached from their conjunction. 
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The first conception is the theory-based conception of the physical. A property is 
physical under this conception if is a property contained within physical theory, 
or supervenient upon such a property. Charge is a physical property under this 
conception, because charge is one of the properties of fundamental entities as 
described by physical theory. Chemical properties such as electronegativity are 
also theory-physical, being supervenient upon fundamental physical properties. 
The second is the object-based conception, under which a property is considered 
physical if is required for a complete description of all properties of a 
paradigmatic physical object. The composite property of being a stone is thus a 
physical property under this conception. 
 
By ‘all properties’, Stoljar is referring to the intrinsic properties of physical 
objects as well as the properties contained in physical theory. Physical theory, 
after all, contains only such properties as are relational or dispositional. 
Therefore, there are more object-physical properties than theory-physical 
properties. The intrinsic properties would not be accessible from the outside (i.e. 
to science), and the only allusion to their existence is the physical (i.e. relational 
and dispositional) properties which may supervene upon them. If we were to find 
consciousness, it would surely be among those object-physical properties, for 
consciousness is inaccessible from the outside. Thus, if we accept the subjective, 
first-person nature of phenomenal consciousness, it is clear that only this 
conception of the physical can accommodate it. 
 
Is the object conception physical? This is primarily a matter of semantics, and 
whether a particular physicalist wishes to argue that object-physical properties 
are themselves physical will depend upon his attachment to calling himself a 
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physicalist. I, for instance, am not content to define object-physical properties as 
physical if they do not concern an entity’s dispositional relationship towards other 
entities. In short, physics concerns causality, and intrinsic properties have no 
causal effect. Furthermore, any attempt to force all properties in the Universe 
into the category ‘physical’ seems suspicious, for it makes physicalism both 
undeniably true, and trivially so; without a concise definition of what is physical, 
the term ‘physicalism’ loses any useful meaning. 
 
Since I shall be utilising the term frequently from this point, it would be useful to 
clarify what I mean by ‘intrinsic’. Of course, it is the case that in a certain 
(everyday) sense of the term, an electron is intrinsically negatively charged. This 
sense seems to be synonymous with ‘by definition’, and is not the sense in which 
I employ the word. Another aspect of the common definition of ‘intrinsic’ is the 
notion that an object necessarily possesses such a property. Needless to say, this 
is not part of my use of the word. By ‘intrinsic’, I mean those properties which 
describe what an entity is, independent of its dispositional properties, i.e. charge, 
mass and so on. An electron has certain physical properties, but it is likely that 
there is also a character to it which is intrinsic, i.e. the thing in itself. Two 
electrons could be physically identical, but intrinsically quite different. 
Characterising intrinsic properties is exceptionally difficult, since the only 
properties we can conceptualise are physical ones. Even if one is a physicalist, 
however, one can see that this is very much akin to the relationship between 
neural activity and phenomenal consciousness: we never have access to 
consciousness, it seems to be ‘inside’ the brain in some way. In an analogous 
way, the intrinsic nature of an electron is ‘inside’ the electron, and can in 
principle never be accessed, since for equipment to detect something requires 
interaction, and interaction is by definition physical. 
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The appeal of physicalism 
The most obvious advantage of physicalism over dualism and panpsychism is 
that it makes a certain amount of intuitive sense. Given that physicalism is 
paradigmatic in all areas of science, it is easy to see how one might naturally 
presume its truth in the case of consciousness. Substance dualism held a similar 
appeal in Descartes’ time, when the idea of there being immaterial souls of some 
kind was commonplace as a result of the religious influence on Western culture. 
 
The chief advantage of physicalism over substance dualism is that it does not 
have to account for interaction between mind and body. The precise nature of 
mental causality remains a mystery, but it is generally taken that the decision-
making and cognitive processes are physical, so there is no need to account for a 
non-physical entity somehow interacting with a physical one. 
 
An intuitive advantage of physicalism over panpsychism is that it removes the 
somewhat uncomfortable notion of simple entities having an inner mental life. Of 
course, the problem of emergence remains, and whether or not anything can be 
truly ontologically emergent is an ongoing debate. It seems clear that if a theory 
can account for consciousness without requiring the existence of ontological 
emergence, such a theory would have an advantage over the alternative, simply 
because it would be less metaphysically elaborate. Such a theory could emerge 
from the physicalist paradigm, as physicalism per se does not require that 
consciousness be truly emergent (some versions do not even hold that it is 
epistemologically emergent, being simply obvious from the totality of physical 
facts about the world). 
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Causal closure 
Another argument often employed is one from the principle of causal closure. It 
is argued (such as by Yablo, 1992) that, since mental events cause physical 
events, and the physical is causally closed, the mental must itself be physical. 
This is obviously advantageous to those who (like me) want to retain a 
physicalist ontology. However, the argument may be of little or no relevance to 
the matter of phenomenal consciousness. 
 
As argued in the first chapter of this dissertation, it is not obviously the case that 
phenomenal consciousness has a causal role to play, and there seem to be 
strong arguments against its being part of any causal chain. Yet there is more to 
the mental than the phenomenal; the observable biomechanical chain of events 
that leads me to avoid painful stimuli can be explained, as I have argued 
previously, without referring to phenomenal consciousness. The events in this 
chain are ‘mental’ in that they affect an organism’s behaviour, so according to 
Yablo they would indeed have to be classed as physical. Yet if the phenomenal 
properties of the system are not part of its function and therefore causal chain, 
we are not forced to admit that they must be physical. 
 
The strengths of physicalism seem to revolve around its intuitive appeal and its 
ability to conserve the nature of the Universe as we currently see it. The 
argument from causal closure not only preserves the physical status of mental 
events, but does so by evoking a principle of physics with which people are 
generally very comfortable. The argument seems to hold if by ‘mental’ we are 
referring to psychological mechanisms such as decision and the command of 
limbs. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the only relevant aspect of 
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the mental is the phenomenal, and it is not clear that phenomenal consciousness 
has a causal role. 
 
Jackson’s knowledge argument 
It is a fact doubted by very few (albeit one which can only be verified in the first 
person) that consciousness exists in this world, and it is also a fact that there is 
no agreed-upon physicalist explanation for how this phenomenon occurs. 
Therefore, there is an epistemic gap. Whether or not there is an ontological gap I 
shall explore with two arguments; the knowledge and conceivability arguments. 
 
Jackson’s (1982) knowledge argument can be used as an example to illustrate a 
problem with physicalism which I believe a panprotopsychist theory does not 
have. The scenario, in short, is that a physicist, Mary, is housed in a completely 
colourless room in which she learns every physical fact about visual perception 
(in a world where all such facts are known). When she has completed her 
training, and knows every physical fact about visual perception, she steps out of 
her room and sees a red flower. The question that is then posed is: does Mary 
learn something new when she sees the flower? If she does, then the physical 
facts about perception do not constitute all of the facts about perception, and 
physicalism is false. 
 
There are several physicalist arguments which attempt to show either the 
invalidity of the argument or its inability to cause distress to physicalism. The 
former sort, for instance, might argue that Mary could not have known all 
physical facts if she did not know what red looked like. This, it seems, is 
question-begging, because such an argument must take as a premise that 
phenomenal redness is a physical property. The two other dominant positions in 
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response to the knowledge argument are known as the ability hypothesis and the 
acquaintance hypothesis. I shall outline both of these here, and shall argue that 
ultimately neither is as intuitively appealing as accepting the knowledge 
argument and moving forward with a theory which is not entirely physicalist. I 
shall focus on the arguments made by David Lewis in particular, as they highlight 
what I believe to be a fundamental problem with physicalist counter-arguments 
to the knowledge argument. 
 
The ability hypothesis (defended primarily by Lewis, 1988 and Nemirow, 2007) is 
that Mary does not learn any new fact when she sees colour for the first time. 
Instead, she gains the ability to recognise that colour. In other words, in learning 
what red is like, Mary in fact learns how to visualise and recognise red. The 
alternative, according to Lewis, is to accept that learning what red looks like 
constitutes propositional knowledge, and that because this is incompatible with 
physicalism, the ability hypothesis is preferable. 
 
On the one hand, it seems as though I might sympathise with this; I am 
attempting to argue for a theory that is as compatible with physicalism as 
possible. However, to argue that a theory should be rejected because it is 
incompatible with physicalism presupposes that physicalism is preferable to 
every alternative, which is what the knowledge argument disputes. Lewis further 
argues that the ability hypothesis is not only compatible with physicalism, but 
explains everything that could be explained by claiming Mary’s knowledge to be 
factual. I believe this not to be the case, for by definition the ability hypothesis 
does not explain how Mary gains propositional knowledge, as it seems clear that 
she does. 
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When Mary is learning everything physical about colour perception, for example, 
she will learn everything that happens in the realm of physics, chemistry and 
biology which results in red sensations. She would certainly know the names of a 
great deal of colours. She would not, however, be able to map any quale to a 
colour name. Lewis himself gives the analogy of an x-y co-ordinate graph; being 
given all of the facts about a point's location on the x-axis tells us nothing about 
its place on the y-axis. Only when Mary exits the room, and is probably told by 
someone that this flower is red and that its stem is green, can she learn that this 
is what red looks like. No new ability seems to have been acquired. 
 
Indeed, a major problem with the ability hypothesis is that abilities seem to be 
able to vary greatly while experiences remain the same. Suppose that Mary does 
not have the ability to visualise colours. This does not mean that, when she 
experiences green, she cannot identify it as green. When she is no longer having 
the perception, she cannot remember what the experience was like. She has not 
gained any ability by looking at the colour, but as long as she is doing so, she 
has some sort of knowledge: knowledge that green looks a particular way. 
 
Lewis agrees that no amount of lessons in the psychophysics of perception will 
grant Mary the knowledge of what it is like to see red, however he emphasises 
that no lessons of any kind can provide this knowledge. Hypothetically, if Mary 
were to learn every non-physical fact about something, she still would not be 
able to deduce the experience of seeing red. At this point, in order to avoid the 
precise kind of question-begging that I have only lately accused certain 
physicalists of doing, it seems possible only to say: talk of physical and non-
physical lessons is clearly unhelpful. Whether one is a physicalist, a dualist, a 
panpsychist, or what have you, to say that Mary learns everything simpliciter 
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about colour perception but never learns what red looks like is clearly 
nonsensical. Lewis and I might both conclude that the only way to have a 
thorough education on the subject is to experience every colour. According to 
Lewis, then, Mary’s education is not incomplete because it is a physicalist 
education; it is incomplete because its teaching methods are insufficient. 
 
I believe the point remains, however, that Mary learns something new upon 
seeing the colour red for the first time. It is significant that while physical facts 
can be conveyed by one person to another, phenomenal ones cannot. I do not 
think that Lewis’ casual reference to Mary potentially learning non-physical facts 
holds much weight; such things seem to be as inherently difficult to discuss 
substantially as qualia. Since we have no access to anything non-physical (as 
previously discussed, the only realistic candidates for non-physicality are intrinsic 
properties, and we have no access to these), it is hard to see how Mary could 
possibly learn them from lessons. This is not, in itself, an argument for qualia 
being non-physical, but it highlights that phenomenal facts and ‘non-physical 
facts’, whatever these might be, have one thing in common: neither can be 
conveyed, in stark contrast to physical facts. That there can be facts outside of 
physical facts is the point of the knowledge argument. 
 
Ultimately, the ability hypothesis is unconvincing. The distinction between the 
knowledge that Mary gains and the ability that she gains is far too strong for the 
hypothesis to be sustainable. 
 
As Lewis hinted, there seems to be no way other than acquaintance by which 
Mary can come to know what red is like. Some, such as Conee (1994), believe 
that acquaintance is an entirely separate kind of knowledge which is neither 
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propositional nor an ability. Mary, then, knows everything about colour 
perception before she exits her room, but is not acquainted with it. She knows 
everything about the physical mechanisms behind the perception of the colour 
red, but she has not had intimate access to it, and this is what she gains when 
she sees it for the first time. 
 
There is a large and obvious flaw in this hypothesis. I certainly agree that 
acquaintance is the only way in which knowledge about consciousness can be 
obtained. What is less clear, however, is how a physicalist can account for this. I 
can, as a non-physicalist, easily accommodate facts which do not pertain to the 
physical realm and as such cannot be accessed by physical means (including 
teaching, which is a physical method of information distribution). It is not at all 
clear that a physicalist can account for this. Merely admitting that this is the 
case, as Lewis does, does not constitute an account of why such facts are 
incommunicable. 
 
There does not seem to be a physicalist counter-argument to the Mary case 
which is less elaborate and counter-intuitive than the initially uncomfortable 
conclusion that physicalism is far from certainly true. Not according with intuition 
is not a major problem normally, but since the knowledge argument is an 
argument which appeals to intuition, it seems problematic that physicalist 
solutions are, more often than not, less intuitive than the admission of non-
physicalism. In the final chapter of this dissertation, I shall return to the 
knowledge argument and argue that my own theory can accommodate Mary’s 
situation without compromising too much of a physicalist attitude. It is my hope 
that physicalists will be able to accept my position, reconciling the knowledge 
argument with a naturalist model. 
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The a posteriori physicalist view has intuitive appeal in that it preserves a 
physicalist view of the world while still acknowledging the evident existence of 
consciousness. In the first chapter I discussed the way some compare knowledge 
about consciousness with knowledge about water; once one has enough 
empirical knowledge of water, one can know that it is identical with H2O.  
However, there seems to be a disanalogy between water and consciousness. It is 
impossible for us to conceive of a world identical to our own with regards to H2O 
but which differs with regards to water. To modify Jackson’s thought-experiment, 
Mary would know everything about water once she knew everything physically 
about H2O (except what it is like to drink it and so on, but that is hardly the sort 
of objection that a physicalist would raise). A parallel thought experiment 
wherein Mary learns every physical fact about water, steps outside of her 
laboratory and discovers that water is H2O does not make even prima facie 
sense. Of course, for a physicalist to claim that the original version does not 
make sense for a similar reason is to assume that there is a physical explanation 
for consciousness. The H2O-water identity has been empirically confirmed; the 
consciousness-function identity has not. 
 
It seems that problems with this form of physicalism can be revealed by the 
following argument involving intensions. Where the extension of a term is its 
truth value (i.e. its presence or absence in the world), intension refers to 
possible worlds in which a statement might be true. The primary intension of an 
expression is whatever fulfils the role of that expression in a particular centred 
world. For instance, the primary intension of ‘water’ would be something along 
the lines of ‘the clear, drinkable liquid in rivers’. The secondary intension is fixed 
in all counterfactual worlds by its use in an actual world, ergo the secondary 
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intension of ‘water’ is H2O. These intensions have different epistemic functions, 
so that it is primarily or 1-conceivable that there is a world in which water is not 
H2O, where the clear, drinkable liquid in rivers is something else in a particular 
centred world. It is not 2-conceivable, because the secondary intension makes us 
consider other worlds as counterfactual, so the term ‘water’ is fixed by our use 
for it to refer to ‘H2O’. 
 
Assuming one endorses the contentious position, as I do, that conceivability 
entails possibility, if it is conceivable that a world may exist which is physically 
identical to our own but has no phenomenal properties, then there is some world 
in which the primary intension of ‘all physical facts but no phenomenal facts’ is 
true. If this is the case, then some world must instantiate this fact, and thus 
physicalism (which holds that in all worlds, the totality of physical facts 
comprises the totality of all facts) is false. Note that the primary and secondary 
intensions of consciousness are identical; an experience cannot feel conscious 
and not therefore be an instance of consciousness. 
 
An a posteriori physicalist may respond that the case of consciousness is unique, 
and that the psychophysical dependence must hold in all worlds, unlike other 
cases in which a statement S being conceivable entails some world instantiating 
S. However, it is arguable that such a position is motivated only by the desire to 
preserve physicalism. Another possible response is to claim the existence of 
intrinsic properties such as those mentioned previously. 
 
The conceivability argument 
A far deeper debate concerns the conceivability argument (Chalmers, 1996). This 
requires us to imagine that there is a world physically identical to our own but 
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which lacks phenomenal properties. The residents of this world, known as 
zombies, are capable of thinking and behaving as we do, however there is 
nothing it is like for them to do so. 
 
The success of this argument depends upon there being an entailment from the 
conceivability of a proposition to its possibility; if there is no such entailment 
then the argument, while valid, does not pose a problem for physicalism. It 
would be impossible to discuss the whole breadth and depth of the 
conceivability-possibility debate here. However, I shall provide a very 
rudimentary argument for the entailment. I simply appeal (as Chalmers does) to 
logical possibility. If something is conceivable then it must be logically possible. 
If it is logically possible, then the world could have turned out that way but did 
not because of contingent natural laws. Therefore, the world could have turned 
out to be zombie-world. 
 
As with the knowledge argument, the conceivability argument is designed to 
refute physicalism by showing it to be unable to accommodate something which 
is obviously the case. Once I have presented this argument, I will be in a position 
me to present my theory, and in the next chapter, I shall do so and show how 
well it bears the conceivability argument. 
 
I have already mentioned a priori physicalism, which denies the first premise of 
the conceivability argument on the grounds that the proposition that there could 
be two worlds which are physically identical but not identical simpliciter is 
contradictory. My response to this argument is that its first premise seems to be 
that physical identity entails identity simpliciter, which is what physicalism holds 
to be true anyway. Thus, such an argument is question-begging. 
48 
 
A more suitable argument against the first premise might be to suggest that we 
cannot conceive of a physically identical world because our battery of physical 
properties may be incomplete. Dennett, for instance, claims that when trying to 
conceive of zombies, we may “underestimate the task of conception” (1998, 
172). If it is possible that we do not currently know all of the physical properties 
or entities, then we can be said to have an incomplete notion of the ‘physical’ 
nature of an entity. Therefore, we may not have a clear enough understanding of 
what it means for two of anything to be physically identical. Thus, even if we are 
only asked to imagine two people rather than two worlds (itself an enormous 
task), we have insufficient data for a full picture. I do not believe that this 
argument is an especially powerful indictment of the conceivability of zombies. I 
cannot conceive of every property of a coffee mug, since if the battery of 
physical properties currently understood is incomplete, then the coffee mug 
could easily have physical properties of which I cannot conceive. Nonetheless, I 
can conceive of its relevant details; a vessel which holds liquid, has a certain 
weight, shape and appearance. Thus, I believe it can be said of me that I am 
capable of conceiving of it. When trying to imagine a zombie, we are asked to 
imagine someone with all of the normal human physical, anatomical and 
psychological characteristics, only without phenomenal consciousness. For 
obvious reasons, it is impossible to imagine what it is like to be such a person 
(because there is nothing it is like), so we imagine this being from a third-person 
perspective. That is not difficult; it is only a presumption that every other human 
is phenomenally conscious, but it is not something I take into consideration when 
imagining or interacting with people. Thus, to imagine a zombie, there is no 
reason why we must do anything more strenuous than imagine a person 
standing before us. Furthermore, we are not being asked to imagine the zombie 
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so much as the consequences of the person being a zombie, i.e. none. We are 
being asked to imagine that there is no outward difference between ourselves 
and our zombie counterparts. This is very easy indeed. 
 
What route is available to a physicalist who does not deny either of the premises 
but only the conclusion; that physicalism is false? It might be tempting at this 
stage for a physicalist to say that while physicalism might not be true in every 
world, it is true in this one. I do not believe that this argument carries much 
weight, however, because physicalism is surely only a significant hypothesis if it 
holds the physical to be supreme in every possible world. 
 
There does not seem to be much in the way of substantive counter-arguments to 
the conceivability argument. At least, none which do not lead to a priori 
physicalism, which is a distinctly undesirable class of theory. In the next and final 
chapter, I shall show that my theory is not weakened by the conceivability 
argument, although it may seem to be at first. 
 
Conclusion 
I have attempted to show that the two most significant anti-physicalist 
arguments, the knowledge and conceivability arguments, are sufficiently 
damaging to physicalism to warrant a new theory. The theory needs to be able to 
survive these arguments, or at least not be susceptible to any particularly 
substantial issues (such as those suffered by physicalism). Any new theory 
should also take into account the problems with panpsychism which I discussed 
in the previous chapter. 
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The most crucial aspect of physicalism which I believe should be preserved is the 
general physicalist picture, as it applies to every other field of science. Apart 
from consciousness, we have no reason to suspect the existence of anything that 
does not fit into such a model of the world. If we wish to create a theory which is 
compatible with a physicalist picture of everything else, then it needs to be based 
upon a conception of the physical which can accommodate the non-physical; 
such a theory should be based upon the notion of intrinsic character. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INTRINSIC NATURALISM 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I have used the term ‘panprotopsychism’ to 
describe the theory to which all others have been compared; the theory which I 
have promised to describe in this chapter. However, while the final theory 
proposed here will be panprotopsychist as it is defined, I do not believe that the 
term is precise. The theory I am going to discuss here is more properly called 
‘intrinsic naturalism’. It will share aspects of panpsychism, physicalism, and 
neutral monism. My aim is to arrive at a model which is compatible with the 
scientific spirit of physicalism, but which does not claim consciousness itself to be 
physically reducible. It can be thought of as belonging broadly to the category of 
property dualism.  
 
The use of the term ‘naturalism’ in the name of this theory is justified in that the 
theory is perfectly compatible with the findings of science. Further, it shows 
consciousness to be dependent upon natural properties, not strange ‘additional’ 
or unscientific properties such as in a substance dualism. 
 
Intrinsic properties 
Physics studies and explains the behaviour of entities in the Universe. It is fair to 
say that an entity’s physical properties, therefore, are its dispositions to behave 
in certain ways under certain conditions. For instance, electrons have the 
physical characteristics of a particular charge, mass, spin and so forth. Each of 
these characteristics is an electron’s disposition to act in particular ways under 
particular conditions. 
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These dispositional properties are likely to be supervenient upon intrinsic 
properties (Strawson (2008) argues that the two may even be identical, on the 
grounds that they are indistinguishable to us; I do not endorse this view, but I 
do concur that the dispositional and categorical properties of an entity are surely 
related). Intrinsic properties are properties which cannot be accessed through 
our senses, or through science. This is because, by definition, the only properties 
which science can examine are those which react with the world in some way; 
the dispositional or physical properties. The intrinsic nature of an electron 
remains mysterious, perhaps forever. I shall refer to the totality of an entity’s 
intrinsic properties as ‘what it is to be’ the entity, or its ‘intrinsic character’. 
 
As an illustrative example, let us consider a being who can occupy any form it 
wishes, to the point where it is indistinguishable by any means at our disposal 
from the object which it mimics. If it chooses to take the form of a brick, it will 
demonstrate all of the properties of a brick, keeping its shapeshifter properties 
shielded. The brick properties are analogous to physical properties, being all that 
can be accessed by human science. No matter what we attempt, the object 
responds as a brick would respond, revealing nothing of its secret nature. It is 
objectively not a brick (or more accurately, there is more to it than its brick 
properties), yet we have no way of discovering this. 
 
This notion of an objective character inaccessible by empirical means has its 
roots in Plato’s cave allegory, as well as Kant’s concept of a ‘noumenal realm’ in 
which the objective characteristics of entities can be found. In both of these 
ideas, a clear distinction is made between the sorts of properties found in 
standard empirical enquiry, and properties which are in some way ‘internal’ to 
entities, and cannot be accessed from the outside. These are the properties 
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which I call ‘intrinsic’. One can identify an object with its physical character (as 
we do in everyday discourse), or its intrinsic character (as I intend to, for the 
most part). 
 
As I noted in the previous chapter, this distinction between the physical 
properties of objects and their intrinsic nature is one which has been made by 
Daniel Stoljar (2001). He classifies his model, however, as an a priori physicalist 
view of consciousness. This, I believe, is a mistake. The intrinsic properties which 
Stoljar hold to be a subset of ‘o-physical’ properties are not physical in any 
standard sense. They are, by definition, non-causal. An entity’s physical 
properties are the only ones to which we can ever access, because our methods 
are physical. Therefore, any theory which holds intrinsic properties to exist is 
acknowledging the existence of non-physical properties, and cannot legitimately 
claim to be physicalist.  
 
Intrinsic properties are, as Stoljar argues, properties required by a complete 
description of an object, however they are not required for a physical description 
of the object. When I consider two worlds which are physically identical, I only 
consider what Stoljar would call the t-physical properties: the properties which 
are physical in the standard (dispositional and relational) sense. Stoljar, 
however, believes that physical identity also entails intrinsic identity. Thus, if 
consciousness is found among the intrinsic properties of the Universe, one 
cannot have two worlds which are physically identical and intrinsically (thus 
phenomenally) distinct. As I shall argue later in this chapter, I believe that the 
relationship between the intrinsic and the physical can be argued to be such that 
two worlds can differ intrinsically while still being physically identical. 
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Perceivers 
The difference between ‘what it is to be’ and ‘what it is like to be’ is, I believe, 
inexpressibly enormous when discussing, say, an electron; it is, however, only 
slight when discussing a living human brain. Both entities have an intrinsic 
character, so why have I denied electrons to be conscious in previous sections of 
this dissertation? In the first chapter, I mentioned that it was likely that 
consciousness could only belong to a functional system. When I discussed 
panpsychism, and gave the example of a brain in a state of slow-wave 
unconsciousness, I introduced the idea that consciousness can only be a property 
of functional systems of a particular kind. Now I shall be yet more specific: I 
believe that consciousness can only be a property of perceivers. Further, that 
consciousness is part of the intrinsic character of such entities. 
 
Let a perceiver be any system which takes in information, the system altering 
itself to accommodate and process the information, resulting in the creation of a 
representation of the external world. Clearly, a human brain is the paradigmatic 
example. I do not believe there is any prima facie reason to suggest, for 
instance, that a computer is not a perceiver. However, for simplicity’s sake, and 
to avoid controversy, the brain is by far the more straightforward example. 
 
An electron is not a perceiver. It reacts instantly to external conditions according 
to its dispositions to do so. It takes in no information, and is not capable of 
altering itself to accommodate or process the information. How could it? An 
electron is an elemental entity, having no component parts. What it is to be an 
electron is, quite literally, to be among the simplest entities in the Universe.  
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Let me briefly return to Chalmers’ example of a thermostat, which is a functional 
system. It is true, as Chalmers argues, that thermostats hold ‘information’ in the 
strictest sense of the term. However, the information is not processed in any 
sense; while I might concede that the bimetallic strip is somehow ‘representing’ 
the ambient temperature by its curvature (and I doubt that I would concede 
even that), there is certainly not even the most rudimentary kind of information 
processing taking place. The difference between this system and a human brain 
is that the thermostat is only passive in its representation (if indeed the 
curvature of metal can be said to be a representation of temperature). A human 
brain constructs representations of the external world, in a series of processes 
which have been demonstrated to add information to plug gaps in sensory input 
(this is how optical illusions come to be effective). There is not even the most 
rudimentary sense in which any kind of construction is occurring within the 
bimetallic strip inside the thermostat. 
 
The human brain, being a perceiver, is a system which takes in information, 
accommodates and manipulates that information, and produces some kind of 
output. It therefore has the intrinsic character of such a system. It is my 
intention to argue that phenomenal consciousness is part of this intrinsic 
character, and comes about as a result of the processing of particular kinds of 
information. My account has prima facie similarities with a priori physicalism, in 
that I seem to be identifying consciousness with representation. What 
differentiates my account from a Type-A account is that I am identifying 
experience with the intrinsic character of systems which create representations, 
not merely the systems or representations from a functional point of view. 
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We have already seen that there are kinds of information which the brain 
processes unconsciously. Here I have claimed that perceptual information is the 
sort that gives rise to consciousness, but what is the essential difference 
between perceptual input (which is conscious) and the processing and output 
(which is not)? It is difficult to articulate such an idea, and appeals to intuition 
would be circular: perceptual information is different because it seems different, 
but it is the fact that it seems like anything that is the puzzle. Perhaps an 
appropriate articulation would involve an appeal to representation; we have 
phenomenal experiences of perceptual input because the result of that input is 
the creation of an image (including sound, smell etc.), and consciousness is part 
of the intrinsic character of a system that creates such an image. Outputs such 
as the control of limbs, however, do not involve the creation of a representation. 
 
How does this position deal with an a priori physicalist position which holds 
consciousness to be identical to our representations of the world? The 
representation is the result of physical processes, however it does not produce 
consciousness, nor is it consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is an intrinsic 
property of systems which construct and hold such representations. 
 
What sort of system does this? I have already argued against ‘mechanical’ 
thermostats, but there are electronic thermostats which operate with chips that 
detect the external temperature (by mechanical means as in a basic thermostat, 
using ‘thermistors’, which change their electrical resistance as temperature 
alters) and then transform that information in a representation, usually on a 
liquid crystal display that can be read. It is a very basic system compared to a 
brain, but I can see no reason not to qualify it as a perceiver: it absorbs 
information, which has an effect on the structure of the system, and manipulates 
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that information to produce an output, in this case changing what is displayed on 
a screen. 
 
In short: Intrinsic naturalism holds phenomenal consciousness to be an intrinsic 
property of any system which creates and holds complex representational 
information. This happens whenever we are awake or dreaming; the ‘Cartesian 
theatre’ is very detailed and constantly updated. 
 
Physical-Intrinsic supervenience and the conceivability argument 
The exact relationship which my theory requires between the physical and 
intrinsic is a complex one, but I do not believe there are any essential problems 
with it. There must also be a relationship between the physical properties of 
systems and their intrinsic properties, otherwise a non-functional collection of the 
same entities would be conscious. Therefore, the physical (functional) nature of a 
system must be a factor in its intrinsic nature. Immediately a problem seems to 
appear; essentially I seem to be proposing is that the intrinsic properties of 
systems (henceforth IS) are supervenient upon the physical, which itself 
supervenes upon the intrinsic properties of elemental entities (IE). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If this were the case, then it might make intrinsic naturalism vulnerable to the 
conceivability argument, since no two worlds could be physically identical without 
also being IS-identical. In zombie-world, the functional systems are all 
IE 
Physical 
IS 
Fig. 4.1 - Supervenience 
The arrows indicate supervenience. 
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dispositionally identical; why should the intrinsic properties be different? After all, 
zombies are perceivers and thus there is something it is to be them, even when 
they are processing sensory representations. How can one say that there is not 
something it is like to be them if one argues that in non-zombies the intrinsic 
character contains qualia? 
 
I believe that such an argument may arise from a confusion. To argue as one 
might above, that zombie worlds are impossible due to the intrinsic being 
identical with the phenomenal, one has to alter the proposed relationships so 
that the physical can modify the intrinsic. This is not what is happening. Instead, 
the component parts of any system (ultimately the elementary particles) retain 
their intrinsic characters. The system itself has an intrinsic character, i.e. what it 
is to be a brain, and it is this intrinsic character of which phenomenal 
consciousness is a part. 
 
 
 
What I am saying is that instead of a supervenience relationship, we should think 
of the IE as properties of physical entities, and IS as properties of functional 
systems. Thus, we begin to see a very clear property dualism emerge. At the 
most basic level are the intrinsic and physical properties of fundamental entities. 
Then we build systems, and we have the intrinsic and physical properties of 
those, the latter of which we can label ‘functional’. Finally, we are left with the 
puzzle of the relationship between the two levels of intrinsic property. I believe 
that we can satisfy ourselves as to this point by reminding ourselves of the 
relationship between the physical and the intrinsic: the physical properties of an 
entity are the dispositional properties of that entity, and this entity also has an 
IE Physical 
IS Functional 
Fig. 4.2 – Intrinsic character as properties 
Here, X      Y means that Y is a property of X. 
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intrinsic character. Therefore, if a system has physical properties above those of 
its constituent parts (and it must or we would not build systems), then it too 
must have an intrinsic nature: the intrinsic nature of the system as a whole. 
There is something it is for an object to be a computer, or a cat, that is distinct 
from non-functional entities such as a deactivated computer or dead cat. 
 
What is most important to note is that it is conceivable, and therefore possible 
that zombie world could exist under intrinsic naturalism. It is a very difficult thing 
to conceptualise, since it would entail a world identical to ours with respect to its 
physical properties which differs with regards to intrinsic ones. Chalmers claims 
that our world could easily have turned out to be zombie-world, however in 
intrinsic naturalism, this is not the case. Copying all of the physical properties of 
one world into another requires a compatible intrinsic character. This could vary 
wildly, but we have no reason to speculate that it should do so, nor that the 
battery of intrinsic properties are infinitely co-variable (physical properties 
themselves are not; not all combinations of physical properties will create a 
functional universe). Instead, we might create a great many physical duplicates 
before one is created whose intrinsic properties do not happen to include qualia. 
Vulnerability to the conceivability argument is only entailed by denying the 
possibility of zombies, and intrinsic naturalism is not obliged to do this. Unlike 
Chalmers, however, I am forced to admit that zombie worlds are probably an 
extreme rarity. The hypothetical God would have had a lot more work to do to 
make this world a zombie world. 
 
What of the principle which I outlined at the beginning of this chapter, wherein 
the intrinsic underlies the physical in a supervenience relationship between the 
two? In figure 4.2 I showed that we should think of the intrinsic properties of 
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physical entities as just those: properties. This does not preclude the idea of the 
intrinsic being the most fundamental level of reality; it is only a different way of 
conceptualising the same idea. I could just as relevantly have drawn the diagram 
showing the intrinsic nature of entities having physical properties (as in Fig. 4.3), 
but because physical properties are the ones with which we are most familiar, it 
was easier to communicate the relationships in the way it was done. 
 
 
 
 
 
The intrinsic properties of systems, on the other hand, do not have this 
relationship with the functional properties of systems. This is one of the most 
difficult ideas to understand, however I believe that it holds. The relationship 
between the functional and intrinsic properties of systems sees the intrinsic 
dependent upon the functional (though only insofar that an intrinsic property is a 
property of the system). I shall characterise this relationship very shortly. 
 
Intrinsic naturalism and physicalism 
A crucial question now is that of intrinsic naturalism’s compatibility with 
physicalism. This has been my objective from the beginning. Of course, by 
‘compatibility’ I do not mean that one can still be a physicalist while holding 
intrinsic naturalism to be the case. I merely mean that one can retain a 
physicalist attitude insofar as physicalism is scientifically grounded (in all cases 
but consciousness), and the dominant paradigm for the explanation of all other 
natural phenomena. 
 
IE Physical 
IS Functional 
Fig. 4.3 – Physical character as properties 
The same relationship as in 4.2, seen in a different light. Here, I am 
equating the basic entity with its intrinsic properties, whereas in 3.2 I had 
equated it with its physical properties. 
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The first way in which intrinsic naturalism is compatible with physicalism is that it 
does not conflict with existing notions of the physical. As previously discussed, 
we can preserve the causal closure of the physical realm while still 
acknowledging consciousness and other intrinsic properties of entities and 
systems. The idea that the physical is only the external manifestation of an 
objective world which we can never in principle access is by no means a new 
one, having been discussed most famously by Plato and Kant. Generally, the idea 
evokes something of a “ho, hum” reaction since if this objective reality cannot be 
accessed in principle then it is of little but academic relevance. In the case of 
consciousness, however, it is extremely relevant that there is a level of reality 
more fundamental than, and inaccessible to, the physical. The argument that 
there is such a level is valid and somewhat unfalsifiable, and this validity lends a 
certain strength to the argument that consciousness itself is non-physical. In the 
first chapter we saw that a posteriori physicalists are, for the most part, 
uncomfortable with consciousness, and their attempts to fit it into a physicalist 
picture of the world reflects this. If, however, one accepts the validity and 
possibility of the idea of an objective reality underlying the physical, then it does 
not seem a massive leap to attach consciousness to that reality. Note my use of 
the word ‘objective’ to describe the realm to which consciousness belongs. I 
mean objective in the sense that it is truly there, and cannot in principle be an 
illusion (the constituents of consciousness may be non-veridical, but 
consciousness itself certainly exists). Of course, it is still subjective in the sense 
of being accessible only by its possessor and incommunicable to anyone else. 
 
One issue seems to remain re causal closure. How can the causal closure of the 
physical remain intact if I seem to be arguing that changes in the physical nature 
of a system can result in alterations to its intrinsic character? The simple answer 
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is merely to reply that the intrinsic character is a property of the system. When 
talking functionally, we may talk of a single system (such as the brain) 
processing multiple perceptual data and producing any number of images from 
any number of inputs. Physically, there is only the very slightest difference 
between my brain when viewing a red flower and my brain when viewing a blue 
one, so because we tend to label multiple things which are incrementally 
different as being the same in some capacity, we consider it the same system. 
Intrinsically, however, these systems are different. It is less that the physical 
change has brought about a change in the intrinsic character of the perceptual 
system, and more that an intrinsically new system now exists. In terms of 
personal identity, this means that one’s intrinsic self is constantly being replaced 
by an incrementally (but in intrinsic terms, substantially) different self.  
 
This may not satisfy everyone with regards to causal closure. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to see why anyone would be so attached to the notion of the intrinsic 
character of systems that they would flinch at these characters being fleeting and 
often completely unique. One might argue that the difference between my 
consciousness now and when I move my head slightly to the right is trivial, and 
that the idea that this constitutes an altogether new system is overly elaborate. 
To this, I simply reply that in the intrinsic realm, any difference between one 
system and another makes the two systems distinct. In functional terms, and for 
reasons of convention, we tend to think of a computer displaying one image and 
then displaying another as the same system, but intrinsically the two are not the 
same. In short, the intrinsic realm is one in which two entities are either identical 
or distinct, and the notion of two non-identical systems being in some abstract 
way ‘the same’ is a nonsense. 
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Does intrinsic naturalism explain anything besides consciousness? Of course it 
does not. The presence or absence of intrinsic properties of entities on a more 
fundamental level than the physical does not impinge upon what we already 
know about the physical nature of the world, except to add a trivial bit of 
information about the underlying nature of entities. Since intrinsic naturalism 
does not alter the nature of the physical, it is perfectly compatible with science. 
In fact, as should be obvious by now, intrinsic naturalism does not require 
science to alter its model of anything. The intrinsic qualities of entities are never 
directly relevant to science, except in the instance of consciousness. 
 
Contrast this with some versions of panpsychism which hold primitive entities to 
demonstrate certain psychological behaviours. Physicalism cannot co-exist with 
these theories, and they are not well grounded in scientific evidence. Similarly, 
substance dualism is not compatible with physicalism because it often requires 
us to reject the causal closure of the physical. 
 
Compatibility with physicalism is extremely important, as it is rightly the 
dominant paradigm for the explanation of every phenomenon in nature. A 
naturalist theory is therefore highly preferable to one which would tamper with 
existing physical and scientific principles. 
 
Relationship to similar theories 
Intrinsic naturalism is a property dualist theory, however it also fits into a few 
other categories. I shall now explore the extent to which it is subject to the 
criticisms of these other theories. 
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The category into which I am primarily placing intrinsic naturalism is that of what 
Chalmers (2002) calls type-F monism or, more specifically, panprotopsychism. 
The properties which are protophenomenal in this instance are the intrinsic 
properties of fundamental entities. I have already argued that, unlike in 
panprotopsychism generally, these properties do not combine to produce 
consciousness, but instead consciousness is among the intrinsic properties of 
certain systems, the systems themselves having been formed through the 
combination of their constituents. All entities possess intrinsic properties, if not 
consciousness itself. This puts intrinsic naturalism in the same class of theory 
(according to Chalmers) as panpsychism, although without the latter’s most 
significant disadvantages. 
 
Another similar theory, or class of theories, to intrinsic naturalism is neutral 
monism. Though there are many variants, the position common to all neutral 
monist positions is that the world is comprised of only one substance. However, 
while a physicalist (or even an idealist) would agree with this, a neutral monist 
claims that this one substance is neither mental nor physical: it is neutral. This 
adjective is generally applied to the intrinsic character of the world, because 
most neutral monists would not wish to argue that there are not physical and 
mental properties of the world; merely mental and physical properties of a 
neutral substance. 
 
It is easy to see the similarity between intrinsic naturalism and neutral monism; 
both theories argue that the world is inherently non-physical. Intrinsic naturalism 
also holds that the world is not intrinsically phenomenal, however since it holds 
that the phenomenal is contained within the battery of intrinsic properties while 
the physical is not, one could claim that intrinsic naturalism borders on 
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Berkeleianism. This, in fact, has been one of the criticisms of neutral monism, 
made by several philosophers (Lenin, 1970; Popper and Eccles, 1977; Nagel, 
2000). In defence of intrinsic naturalism from the charge that it is idealist, I shall 
once again explain the precise relationships implied in intrinsic naturalism. 
Phenomenal consciousness is part of the intrinsic character of systems. The 
functional aspects of a system are supervenient upon the physical properties of 
its component entities, which are themselves supervenient upon the intrinsic 
properties of these entities (see Fig. 4.2). For intrinsic naturalism to be idealist, 
the physical (and mechanical, and functional etc) would have to be supervenient 
upon consciousness. This is clearly not the case. Another criticism of neutral 
monism is that it does not accommodate the mental at all, especially with 
regards to the subjective character of the mind. This criticism obviously does not 
apply to intrinsic naturalism, since consciousness (and with it subjectivity) arises 
not at the fundamental level but on a higher (but still intrinsic) level. 
 
I have previously argued that consciousness itself does not have a causal role, or 
indeed any part in a causal chain. Yet I am also claiming a tie between the 
functionality of a system and its consciousness, so there seems to be some 
tension between these ideas. It seems then that intrinsic naturalism resembles 
parallelism, wherein the phenomenal and the physical coincide without there 
being any interaction between the two. Parallelism is usually only held by those 
who believe that the coincidental parallel between the phenomenal and the 
physical was set up by a supreme being of some sort. Clearly this is not a belief 
which accords with the scientific attitude of intrinsic naturalism, yet what intrinsic 
naturalism seems to argue for is a parallel between the physical and the 
phenomenal. Surely this seems unusual, for if intrinsic naturalism were a 
panprotopsychist theory such as that espoused by Chalmers, then the 
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phenomenal would be dependent to some degree upon the physical. Instead, the 
relationship between the functional and the phenomenal in intrinsic naturalism 
seems to show them running in parallel. In fact, the functional and the 
phenomenal are related more closely than this, and this is because the 
phenomenal aspects of a system belong to the intrinsic character of the system, 
and the system also has a functional aspect (see Fig. 4.4). These aspects are 
only separable in conceptual terms. One cannot change the intrinsic character of 
an object and still claim it to be the same object (my zombie twin and I are not 
identical simpliciter, in other words). 
 
 
 
 
The knowledge argument 
How does intrinsic naturalism fare against the knowledge argument? This is more 
straightforward than my response the conceivability argument. Simply, Mary 
does learn something new, and this is no problem for intrinsic naturalism. In this 
model, Mary becomes, for the first time, a system which perceives red flowers. 
Therefore, she learns part of what it is to be such a system, namely, what it feels 
like. In contrast to physicalism, intrinsic naturalism holds as a central tenet that 
there are facts about the world separate to (and more fundamental than) 
physical facts. Thus, there is no contradiction in Mary knowing every physical fact 
about perception but lacking some other fact. In a zombie world, Mary would not 
learn this fact (though she might believe that she had). In short, the intrinsic 
naturalist position supports the conclusion of the knowledge argument, that 
physicalism must be rejected. 
 
Fig. 4.4 – Physical and intrinsic as part of a whole 
The same relationship as in 4.2 and 4.3, shown with the system (hexagon) and 
its components (triangle) as the focal points of the diagram. This emphasises 
that both the physical and intrinsic properties are merely part of a whole. 
 
 
IE Physical 
IS Functional  
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The combination problem 
We seem to come up against a new combination problem, because I have argued 
that systems have an intrinsic character which simply comes about magically, 
quite separate from the intrinsic character of protons and so forth. To this, I 
merely reply that there is nothing magical about it. Protons have a different set 
of physical dispositions to quarks, even though the former is entirely comprised 
of the latter. There are epistemologically emergent facts in physics, and likewise 
in the realm of intrinsic characters. Three quarks combine to form a proton, 
which is held together by forces, and can be considered a particle. It can then 
combine with other similar particles to form an atom, which can be considered a 
particle (in that it is a discrete object). This can continue up to molecules, cells, 
organs, organisms and maybe beyond to planets and so on (the Universe itself is 
a particle, in that it is a discrete object and can be considered a single entity); 
these composite entities are discrete ‘particles’, regardless of being made of 
other particles. They have their own physical characteristics which come about 
through the combination of the characteristics of their constituents. Similarly, 
there is something it is to be a human, a cell, a molecule and so on all the way 
down to the quarks and leptons which ultimately comprise matter. 
 
At this point, it should be emphasised that the possession of ‘overlapping’ 
properties is far less plausible when applied to consciousness itself (as in 
panpsychism). If one accepts the link for which I have argued between functional 
systems (specifically perceivers) and consciousness, then it is clear that my 
consciousness is not further attributable to my neurons. If one does not, then 
this implies panpsychism or a far more generous emergentism than mine, and 
one encounters the problems I have discussed throughout this dissertation. 
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Intrinsic naturalism – the final picture 
In this chapter, I have shown aspects of the intrinsic naturalist position with 
regards to the relationships contained therein. This picture may seem a little 
unclear due to the emphasis placed upon different aspects of it at different 
stages of the chapter, so here I shall present the final picture as clearly as I am 
able. 
 
The most basic entities in the Universe have both physical and intrinsic 
properties. The physical properties are those with which we are familiar, since it 
is these which determine how an entity will act in the world, and how it will 
interact with other entities. Beneath this dispositional level, however, there is the 
intrinsic character of each entity. This is what the entity is, and it cannot be 
accessed by science; by definition, detection is a form of interaction, and 
interaction is always physical. 
 
Not only fundamental entities have an intrinsic character. Nucleons, atoms, 
molecules, cells and so on all have an intrinsic character which is separate from 
the intrinsic characters of their constituent parts. These intrinsic characters 
interact via the medium of the physical, which invokes another intrinsic 
character; that of the system itself. 
 
Some systems process certain kinds of information in a particular way, making 
them perceivers. The intrinsic character of a perceiver includes phenomenal 
consciousness, which is only a part of the intrinsic character of the system. The 
qualia which comprise consciousness depend upon the physical changes brought 
about in the system. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this dissertation has been to put forward a theory which can 
account for phenomenal consciousness as a non-physical feature of the world 
while still preserving the useful features of a physicalist model. 
 
I attempted to defend the assertion made by David Chalmers that consciousness 
is a surprising feature of the world when seen from a physicalist point of view. 
There have been several historical examples of phenomena which have been 
thought of as surprising, yet none have continued to be do as our physical 
knowledge has expanded. One might be tempted to suggest that consciousness 
will follow this pattern, however I have argued that it will not, and that a non-
physicalist theory must be employed to accommodate a phenomenon that clearly 
exists. 
 
That having been said, a physicalist picture does hold for everything else in the 
Universe (that we have discovered so far), or at least there do not seem to be 
any problems with it doing so in principle. Physicalist principles also stand at the 
centre of scientific and naturalist thinking about the world, so have enormous 
value when discussing issues such as morality, biology, causality and more exotic 
issues such as spirituality. Thus, if we cannot preserve physicalism when 
discussing consciousness, I believe it is desirable to preserve as much of this 
attitude as possible (lest we invite the ‘magical thinking’ which can lead to 
substance dualism). My aim, therefore, has been to extract the best of 
physicalism. 
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After showing initially that physicalism seems unsatisfactory, I explored 
pansychism. While panpsychism has its merits, it has crucial problems such as its 
tendency to contradict or impinge upon established physical principles. Next, I 
discussed physicalism in more detail, exploring the particular advantages and 
disadvantages of a physicalist position. I concluded that what seems to motivate 
a physicalist (including a desire for a science-friendly position on consciousness) 
can be preserved even in a non-physicalist theory. 
 
In the final chapter, I argued for my model: intrinsic naturalism. This model 
includes features from physicalism, neutral monism, and panprotopsychism. It 
appeals to the intrinsic character of fundamental entities and systems. I argued 
that consciousness is a component of the intrinsic character of certain 
(perceptual) systems, and that although a system’s physical (and functional) 
characteristics supervene upon the physical characteristics of the component 
entities, and that these in turn are supervenient upon the entities’ intrinsic 
characters, nothing supervenes upon consciousness. Thus, intrinsic naturalism is 
not a form of idealism. 
 
I showed that intrinsic naturalism could withstand the knowledge and 
conceivability arguments, as well as the combination problem as applied to 
panpsychism. It can also accommodate certain phenomenal states (or lacks 
thereof) which I have argued panpsychism to be unable to do, at least without 
elaborate arguments. 
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